




Learning for professional competence in an IS context 
 
1Peter M. Bednar,, Christine Welch,  
 
1University of Portsmouth, UK, peter.bednar@port.ac.uk 
 
 
Abstract. This paper considers the nature of professionalism as an expression 
of more than technical competence. This is related to the incidence of failure in 
IS change projects. We discuss how professionalism may be displayed, relating 
this to learning processes. The essential qualities of desire, exercise of will and 
their role in professional judgment are considered in relation to transcendent 
values espoused by professionals. We note that organizational consumers of 
information are also professionals, and not simply passive ‘users’ of systems. 
We relate this to the environment of Information Systems research and practice, 
including recognition of the importance of contextual dependencies. 
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The main concern of this paper is to highlight some key concerns that must be 
considered by IS professionals/analysts. In the IS community, we need to prioritize a 
perspective on human activity systems as integrated wholes, and the needs of unique 
individuals within them, rather than focusing blindly on ‘model users’ [12]. We 
reflect upon the high incidence of reported failures of Information Systems 
innovations in organizations over recent decades, relating this to the nature of 
professional competence in IS development practice and the learning which underpins 
it. The discussion draws upon secondary material reporting on failures, including one 
particular case that has received much public attention in the UK – attempts to 
introduce Computer Aided Despatch systems in the London Ambulance Service.  
We begin by examining the nature of organizations as dynamic, open systems. This 
is relevant to the nature of professional IS practice and the requirements for 
professional competence, discussed in the next section. The paper goes on to examine 
instances of failure in IS innovation projects, before returning to consideration of 
appropriate learning to underpin improved professional competence and attempting to 
draw some conclusions. 
1.1  Organization as a System 
Figure 1 shows an organization as a system, with a hierarchical structure of 
functioning sub-systems, interrelated via channels for monitoring, feedback and 
communication. A boundary has been set, differentiating this system from its 
environment, i.e. those aspects of the world which influence system behaviour but 
cannot be controlled from within it. This is effectively a closed systems view, within 
certain parameters. 
 Let us imagine a systemic model of a health centre for example. Sub-systems 
include operational systems for patient consultations, therapy sessions, booking 
appointments, etc. A practice management-system resources the centre, provides for 
rule setting to regulate its use, and ensure effective staffing and materials/equipment. 
A monitoring-system measures levels of supplies, wear-and-tear on equipment, 
waiting times, etc. and alerts the management-system to a need for further resources 
or actions to ensure continued effective functioning. The environment [forces 
affecting the system but not controlled by it] include local demographics, patient 
demands, policies of the Department of Health and Primary Care trusts, and current 
medical research. 
We can recognise this generic picture of health centres. However, it does not 
enable us to distinguish characteristics of any particular centre. The qualities, 
experience, attitudes, beliefs, professional dedication and interests of particular 
medical staff and therapists employed in a particular centre [and, indeed, the 
individual characteristics of other stakeholders such as patients or health service 
administrators] create a unique organization that such a model fails to capture.  
 
Figure 1: Model of an organization as a system 
 
 
Checkland and Poulter [11, p.56] point out that, at any particular time, 
organizational behaviour subsists as an accommodation between differing 
perspectives of stakeholders. This suggests that the view shown in Figure 1 represents 
only a ‘snapshot’ of a phenomenon that is dynamic and constantly changing. As 
Mumford points out [e.g. 29], an open systems perspective on organizations is 
preferable. Any organization subsists from moment to moment as an emergent 
property of the interactions among the people who are its members. In the context of 
networked organizations, dynamic complexity is not merely expanded but radically 
altered. In a networked society, therefore, ICTs support transformations in 
organizational life as it is lived. 
 Bednar [6] describes an alternative view of organizational emergence, recognizing 
that any individual component of a purposeful-activity-system may possess emergent 
properties that are greater than the ‘whole’. Individual components may be 
participating in several perceived ‘Systems’ at the same time (reflecting our 
multifaceted experience of ‘real’ life). Thus, a model of a system may be more akin to 
a set than a hierarchical model [see Figure 2]. The system under consideration and 
any of its component-systems are open and dynamic in a multidimensional way. 
Boundaries are not fixed but subject to continual re-drawing, depending on how the 
perspectives of interested observer(s) may shift to reflect fluctuating purpose(s) over 
time [24]. Organizational roles can also be seen to fluctuate - created and recreated as 
the perspectives/intentions of individual actors and their interactions shift. 
Furthermore, individual actors may occupy multiple roles, creating an effect of 
‘flipping’ perspectives, shaped by contextual dependencies in a constant state of flux. 
Any particular actor’s experience of working life will differ from day to day, and the 
actor is continually creating and recreating him/herself, through experiences in 
multiple roles within various systems in which s/he is a participant member. As 
pointed out by Ulrich [39; 40] in his discussion of boundary critique, perception of a 
system varies with the stance of the observer. This highlights the importance of 
effective participation in organizational decision-making  
 Figure 2: An organization as a dynamic, open system 
 
Langefors [22, p.53] pointed out that organizations require direction from ‘managers’ 
in order to pursue their aims, and that managers require data about all activities and 
transactions conducted in order to provide appropriate direction. He concludes, 
therefore, that an Information System and the organization in which it is located must 
necessarily be seen as one and the same. 
Recognizing this point, we now move on to consider the bases of professional 
competence, in relation to development of organizational information systems. 
 
2  Professional Practice and Competence 
Traditionally, management thinking favoured a view that decisions can be derived 
rationally from objective analysis of relevant data. This view has been reflected in 
many approaches to Information Systems development, where ‘users’ are asked to 
specify their requirements from proposed systems, which professional analysts then 
translate into terms realisable by computing specialists. This perspective is subject to 
criticism [25; 45]. It is a mistake to regard organizational actors as passive ‘users’ or 
consumers of technologies [33; 13]. Langefors, one of the founding fathers of IFIP-
WG8, suggested long ago that: 
 
Nowadays the insight is spreading that to determine IS user needs … requires a 
search-learning process through which the users develop an understanding of 
what their real needs are and what new opportunities have become available to 
them. As a consequence, the users emerge as the key persons in the task of 
analysing user needs. Information analysts appear to have an important part in 
aiding the users in learning and analysing, in doing the documentation in a 
way understandable to the users, while efficient as a design input for the data 
system design stages to follow [48, p.6]. 
 
This view of ‘professional’ practice makes it clear that the term that must be extended 
to all organizational actors who are stakeholders in a proposed system, not just to IT 
specialists. Alvesson [50] has questioned the usefulness of modern views of 
‘professionalism’. Some occupations traditionally described under different terms 
(craft? job?) have now been reinvented under the label of ‘profession’. This has often 
been accompanied by adoption of grandiose titles, unreflective of the real significance 
of the work to be accomplished. While this has sometimes helped to advance the 
status of participants, it has also, at times, complicated and confused ideas about 
practice and underpinning education for practice. However, in the context of IS 
development, it is preferable to regard all stakeholders as professionals within their 
own zones of competence, rather than consigning them to generalized obscurity under 
the title ‘user’ [33].  
In relation to those actors primarily concerned to promote systems development, 
technical skills/knowledge relevant to the domain of competence are, of course, 
necessary; but these are insufficient in themselves without a desire to engage [4]. A 
professional is someone able to reflect upon practice of certain skills in context, and 
relate these reflections to a body of standards and values transcending his/her 
immediate job-role. Often, this involves membership of wider communities of 
practice – formal or informal [23], emphasising the duality of tacit and explicit 
‘knowing’ inherent in exercise of any professional expertise [7; 8]. Bruner [9] points 
out that people do not just learn about the world, they also learn to be in their world.  
More recently, Wenger-Trayner adopted the concept of ‘knowledgeability’, [49; 
44] which involves modulation by individuals of their identification among multiple 
sources of accountability [44]. Knowledgeability is gained through participation in 
multiple communities, some enduring; others more ephemeral. Individuals develop 
competence by negotiating a path through complex systems of communities and 
boundaries, possibly over a protracted period. Wenger- Trayner uses the metaphor of 
a ‘landscape-of-practice’ to denote this system [44]. 
How would the individual improve his/her professional practice over time? What 
motives would govern whether s/he complies with any particular instruction to act in 
a certain way? Engagement with the context of application leading to reflection upon 
practice can promote a productive learning spiral [4; 45; 34], or what Gherardi [47] 
refers to as ‘the creative entanglement of knowing and doing’. It is through profound 
engagement with context and attachment to a transcendent system of values and 
standards that we recognise a professional at work, as opposed to, say, a capable 
amateur.  
Within a formal organizational structure, a person may have a job description 
expressed in terms of appropriate skills, knowledge and roles. This is likely to bear 
only a loose resemblance to actual professional work carried out. Roles are created 
and re-created in conjunction with colleagues, taking into account professional 
standards. Desire to demonstrate skills in context according to particular standards 
and values is demonstrated in part through the informal organization [25; 18]. 
Exercise of judgment is an essential part of professional life. Sometimes, when faced 
with a dilemma, a person will justify an action by the words ‘I had no choice!’. The 
suggestion that there is no choice here is a fallacy [4; 5; 20]. A person who habitually 
chooses a course of action that s/he knows will please ‘the Boss’ on these grounds is 
actually saying is that, weighing up the potential consequences of each available 
choice, s/he took the line of least resistance. Professionalism requires that we 
recognise the choices we make (including the choice to do nothing), their relationship 
to a wider value system, and their impact upon the contexts of professional life. It is 
important to remember that, in any context within which Information Systems 
development taking place, several/many different groups of professionals are at work, 
of which Systems Analysts are only one. 
Drawing on work by Giddens [49] and Foucault [51], Walsham [52] reminds us 
that power relations pervade all organizational activity and discourse, and that 
continuous political processes impact upon any local change initiative. It is possible to 
perceive use of the term ‘user’ (denoting those professionals who are consumers of 
the proposed IS) as an effort to exercise power over them, both by initiating 
stakeholders - such as managers - and by IT specialists. However, those ‘users’ 
themselves exercise power of their own. It is important here to consider sense-making 
activities in relation to experience of work systems [42]. Vaast and Walsham [53] 
have considered how people make sense of their work practices through narratives 
that constitute shared social representations. Practices are reproduced where there is 
consonance between perceptions of action and these representations.  Where gradual 
change in work context is experienced, adaptations in representations occur to 
maintain this consonance. Radical disruptions to context, such as IT innovation, may 
not be so readily assimilated. Devaujany [54] used a critical realist perspective to shed 
light on sociotechnical reflexivity, pointing out that internal conversations about 
technology and its use shape individual experiences on an on-going basis.  
In understanding underpinnings of IS success or failure, it is important to consider 
agency of all groups of professionals upon project outcomes. The next section of the 
paper focuses specifically on the phenomenon of IS failure, using an illustrative case 
study. 
3  Failure in IS innovation 
In 2007, the IT Governance Institute commissioned research into the incidence of 
IT project failure [37], gathering evidence from IT projects in a variety of 
organizations of differing sizes and fields. Out of almost 1700 projects, only 53 (3%) 
were formally cancelled, but 31% either delivered or were expected to deliver 
negative value. 
Thorp comments that persistence with projects already known to be failing could 
be attributed to a culture of blame within many organizations, such that cancellation 
of a project prior to completion was seen as a sign of weakness. Williams [46], 
commenting on this survey, highlights a discrepancy between organizational 
discourse emphasising rationality and decision-making grounded in the cognitive 
zone, when there is clear evidence that emotions, e.g. fear of blame and intransigence 
are impacting upon project status. 
3.1  IT innovation at the London Ambulance Service 
Failures of two projects to introduce Computer Aided Despatch (CAD) systems into 
the London Ambulance Service, in 1987 and 1993, have been well documented in the 
Press. An independent inquiry (the Page Inquiry) was conducted, whose terms of 
reference were to ‘identify the lessons to be learned for the operation and 
management of the London Ambulance Service against the imperatives of delivering 
service at the required standard, demonstrating good working relationships and 
restoring public confidence’. Overall the operational issues identified by Page can be 
summarised as: technical problems, including software bugs and 
incompatibilities/hand-shake failures between units; poor user involvement in initial 
specification and lack of ownership of the solution; poor staff relations and 
communication; inadequate training; big bang approach from manual to automated 
system with concurrent changes to working practices. 
Subsequently, LAS successfully implemented a CAD system (CTAK) developed 
in-house.  In 2009, an initiative was undertaken to replace CTAK with a complete 
package (CommandPoint), employing a leading global security company. The remit 
was to install the software with minimal changes to work practices. An internal report, 
presented to the LAS Trust Board in May of 2011 (the Armitage Report) was 
intended to be an assessment of the state of readiness for the Service to implement 
CommandPoint, with particular reference to lessons learned and recommendations set 
out by Page. The first part of the report dealt with technical recommendations, 
pointing out that extensive testing had been done, surfacing a number of problems 
that had been dealt with. Some outstanding problems were highlighted, including 
tensions between different staff groups; requirement for changes to communication 
styles and terminologies; untested interface with Police systems; and a need to deal 
with some remaining bugs and faults. It was stated that ‘users’ had been fully 
involved in the project, under the auspices of the Deputy Director of Operations, who 
provided ‘consistent and effective user input at a senior level throughout the 
procurement and implementation phase’ - bringing in other users as and when their 
input was needed. The sense of staff ownership of CommandPoint was stated to be 
‘remarkable’ and the feedback from training positive, as was feedback from ‘staff-
side representatives’. 
Some modifications to working practices were deemed necessary, particularly to 
the layout of the Control Room. These changes were considered relatively minor, and 
based on ‘sound reasons’ of operational efficiency. Dry-run simulations had appeared 
satisfactory and a Readiness Checklist was provided and signed off by the Deputy 
Chief Executive prior to going live. It appeared that all was ready to go ahead with the 
project. Only in appendices to the report was a note of caution introduced. The section 
on Risks referred to the following: lack of user confidence in the solution; negative 
publicity for LS; and system performance not meeting user expectations. 
In June 2011, the new system went live, and immediately collapsed. The Control 
Room operators were obliged to revert to pen-and-paper for a time. Delays in 
despatch during this failure contributed to the death of at least one patient and resulted 
in litigation by another. Many software ‘bugs’ emerged after going live. It emerged 
that, as the project progressed, it had slipped further and further behind schedule, 
creating budget pressures. In consequence, a freeze was placed on further changes or 
requirements. This was not mentioned in the schedule of risks and is likely to have 
had a grave impact upon likelihood of success. An investigation into the collapse 
suggested the root causes to be: failure of CommandPoint to deliver the system, 
technical and operational functionality expected; critical configuration issues not 
identified during testing; lack of operational procedures in place in the event of a 
critical system failure; failure to integrate the project into business as usual.  
3.2  Discussion 
Looking at the ways in which failure was experienced in 2011, there is a remarkable 
similarity to the conclusions of the Page Report on the earlier project failures. Since a 
great deal of effort and expense was undertaken to pursue a project informed by these 
recommendations, one must ask whether there are not more fundamental lessons to be 
learned. It may be significant that no mention is made of the team responsible for 
creation and implementation of the earlier CTAK system. It seems likely that many 
lessons were learned in the course of implementing and running this system over a 
period of several years. Was this useful information made available to the 
CommandPoint project team? 
The internal report placed great emphasis on rigour of development processes – 
testing; training; involvement of ‘users’. Subsequent events, however, cast this into 
question. The Trust Board met in anticipation of greater demand for ambulances 
during the upcoming London Olympic Games. Minutes indicated that risks reported 
to the Board included lack of user confidence in the solution, due to system 
performance not meeting user expectation; staff unrest and consequent poor publicity 
were anticipated. Thus, previous confidence about the level of ‘user’ involvement and 
positive ‘user’ feedback during training seem to have evaporated. The Board was of a 
risk that ‘lack of confidence in the reliability and functionality of the system and data 
by operational users will alienate staff, undermine confidence and/or create suspicion 
leading to confused expectations’.  
CommandPoint had previously been used successfully in the United States by both 
law enforcement and city fire services. On this basis, it was assumed that it could be 
introduced into LAS with only a minimum of changes to work practices and 
customisation. Involvement of ‘users’ seems to have been limited to participation in 
training and consultation via the Director of Operations. This suggests that those 
professionals whose work was involved in dealing with public calls for ambulance 
services, triage of priorities and, significantly, those driving through London and 
providing interim medical aid to patients, were only minimally involved in any 
decision-making about the new system. Assumptions were made about the work 
practices of staff and the impact upon them of changes to Computer Aided Despatch. 
No opportunity was available for any of the staff to reflect upon the usefulness of the 
changes and take ownership of the new System – all decisions were made remotely at 
Trust Board Level. In other words, the actors engaged in the work of the Service were 
not treated as professionals in their own right, but as passive ‘users’ 
It is important here to distinguish between ‘usefulness’ in context and other terms 
such as ‘usability’, which is concerned with ergonomic characteristics. This 
distinction is one that may be overlooked when staff are offered training in new 
systems. Only particular users, engaging with particular technologies in order to carry 
out work, can decide whether they perceive them to be useful [2]. McGrath [26] 
discusses emotion in the context of the earlier LAS projects, from the early 1990’s. 
Here, it appeared that the prevailing culture of public service and empathic support 
for patients within LAS came into direct conflict with a rational planning ethic 
intended to increase ‘efficiency’. McGrath reflects that: “The case reveals that 
existing, even apparently latent, conflicts and emotions may surface or heighten when 
IS innovation is attempted. In the LASCAD case, these subjugated knowledges and 
emotions emerged during efforts to achieve cultural change of the LAS through the 
use of ICTs inscribed with government-driven efficiency logic” [26, p.297]. It would 
seem that these lessons were not learned in the interim. 
Friis [55] Points to a need for engaged professionals to take ownership over their 
own work systems, including change projects, in order to promote usefulness. A 
‘symbiosis of knowledge’ is needed between technical experts and working 
professionals who have tacit understandings of contextual dependencies. This can be 
achieved through constructive and situated dialogue. She suggests an approach of 
user-controlled information systems development, achieved when the future ‘users’ 
are regarded not only as problem owners, but also as problem solvers, taking 
responsibility for design and making binding decisions about the design project [55, 
p.225]. Such an approach, we suggest, requires professional engagement and 
commitment from both communities of practice. 
 In the sections that follow, we discuss professional commitment to action as 
involving more than rational, role-based activities but involving exercise of will to 
adhere to a value system. The impact of extra role behaviour [32, 35] in this context 
will be highlighted as a key factor in promoting creation of productive learning spirals 
[4]. 
4  Engagement and Competence 
Rogers [36], in his discussion on diffusion of technology, distinguishes between 
different types of threshold, e.g. the difference between ignorance and knowledge of 
how a technology might be applied as a solution for a particular problem - a key 
aspect of professional competence; or the difference between thinking about 
engagement and engagement itself. This is similar to the distinction between theory 
espoused and theory in use [1]. Discourse about intention often fails to take into 
account the investment of personal resources needed to address the required 
‘unlearning’ [33, 3, 5, 13] involved in innovative practice. There appears to be an 
unwitting belief in rational behaviour as if professional life could be conducted 
without any emotion. In the LAS case (above), it appears that this belief has persisted 
through a catalogue of successive failures, even though successive inquiries have 
reported that staff engagement, confidence and morale were crucial factors, and 
recommended greater staff involvement in future projects. 
Possession of relevant skills/knowledge for a work role is insufficient without 
ability to exercise judgment in exercising those skills, related to a system of values 
that transcend the immediate context. This is the essence of professional engagement. 
In relation to Information System, as in art, desire can only be realised as we open up 
creative spaces for ourselves [30].  
In a professional context, reflection is needed to negotiate such spaces [3, 34, 13]. 
These can become blocked through inappropriate management assumptions [19, 10, 
28, 4], such as are evident in the LAS case regarding modification of work systems. 
As we have seen, an organization may be viewed as a system, made up of interacting 
elements. If any one element leaves the whole, or is changed, then it is no longer the 
same system and all other elements are necessarily affected [19; 22]. There is a need 
for design practice to address whole work systems and not just systems for use of 
particular artefacts. It is necessary for engaged actors to reflect upon their professional 
roles, engagement in those roles, and on engagement of the ‘others’, in order to avoid 
becoming entrapped in a double bind [4; 5; 7; 33; 38] in which they cannot create 
those choices that would empower escape. It is possible to observe 
‘disconnectedness’, i.e. failure to reflect [54]. Entrapment can occur where a person 
feels that there are no choices open to him/her that will satisfy desire [14, 15, 4, 5, 5, 
20]. This might be due to a lack of recognition of choices that are available, or 
inhibition of ability to create choices, as in the case described by Thorp, above [37]. 
Competence in judgment is required. However, this will not necessarily lead to 
appropriate action on its own, without desire for engagement.  
The next section of the paper discusses such professional engagement, and its 
relationship to extra-role behaviour in organizations. 
4.1  Extra-role Behaviour and Professional Development 
Engagement, within a professional context, is related to the phenomenon of extra-role 
behaviour [41; 44]. We are faced with complexity of multiple, competing desires in 
many contexts [4, 5, 2, 6], partly due to the impact of opportunity cost – any choice to 
expend finite resources, including time, involves choosing between priorities. 
Boundary setting [4, 5, 22, 10, 39] is also involved, however. Channelled desire 
comes about through commitment to certain values and consequences. Efforts to 
recognise boundaries of competence involve extra-role behaviour or improvisation 
[43]. Ciborra comments on the MIR space station in relation to bricolage [16, p.2]. 
‘Up there, revolving in space, one could find, hand-in-hand, advanced, robust 
engineering solutions, rustic deign, and widespread virtuoso tinkering.’ 
Such ‘extra-role behaviour’ becomes possible only through commitment to on- 
going reflection upon competence. There is also paradox in that a professional 
engaged must reflect upon ‘the future’ whilst still involved in creating it. This 
involves higher orders of learning [4, 13] in which an individual is reflecting not only 
upon experience, but upon the process of reflecting on exercising judgment - an 
exercise in practical philosophy as part of professional competence in action [13]. 
The engagement of particular individuals in professional work roles is accepted as 
a key attribute of organizational life from many points of view [17; 27; 28]. When 
interviewing a job applicant, employers often ask about the candidate’s hobbies and 
interests. A person who cannot offer anything beyond the strict requirements of the 
job may not be considered suitable. However, there is a possibility that we concentrate 
too much upon role performance when modelling organizations as human activity 
systems, to the exclusion of proper recognition of extra-role behaviour. This can 
certainly be seen in the context of the LAS case, where the boundaries of the project 
were very narrowly drawn and attention to wider work systems, or desires of engaged 
professional staff, were specifically excluded, even where known risks were at stake. 
Work roles are shaped through interactions with others – co-workers, collaborators 
and also family, friends and acquaintances - in multiple contexts. These matters have 
long been recognised in the fields such as organizational behaviour and human 
resource management, through the concepts of formal and informal organizations 
[see, e.g. 21]. A professional’s desire to demonstrate her skills in context according to 
particular standards and values is demonstrated in part through the informal 
organization, drawing upon wider communities of practice. Recognition has been 
given to this dimension within the field of Systems modelling too, e.g. in the Soft 
Systems Methodology [11] through focus on a cultural stream of inquiry. 
It is also not uncommon for managers in organizations to suggest that they wish 
their staff to be creative or innovative - to go beyond their formal roles and skill 
profiles, to exercise all their personal resources in addressing messy and complex 
demands of organizational life [44]. Such personal resources will have been acquired 
and exercised through the individual’s total life experience, not just those experiences 
that form part of their specific work roles. In this instance, the view of individual 
emergence adopted is that suggested in Figure 2. While work roles typically involve 
multiple contextual dependencies, life experiences of individual people nevertheless 
transcend them. It is possible to argue that organizational sustainability is critically 
dependent upon creativity and extra-role behaviour to generate innovation and drive 
the organization forward. 
5  Conclusion 
We have looked at the nature of professional commitment and how transcendent value 
systems and the exercise of judgment are important in creation of beneficial 
organizational developments. We argue a professional is therefore someone who is 
able to reflect upon practice of skills in context, and to relate these reflections to a 
body of standards and values transcending the his/her immediate job role. Often, this 
involves membership of a wider landscape of practice – formal or informal. It might 
be expected then that a professional would engage in extra-role behaviour, e.g. 
suggesting innovative methods, or making efforts to help others in their professional 
roles.  
The potential to go beyond basic requirements of a role to create new boundaries 
involves a higher level of reflection. Thus, extra-role behaviour becomes possible 
only through commitment to on-going reflection upon competence. Such reflection 
involves higher orders of learning [4] in which the individual is reflecting not only 
upon experience, but upon the process of reflecting on exercising judgment. This 
development of a learning ‘spiral’ may be regarded as an exercise in practical 
philosophy. It follows that a rational planning model for considering organizational 
choices involves an inherent paradox for unwary actors. This is clearly demonstrated 
in the events unfolded in the LAS case. Since any observation must, by definition, be 
made by a particular observer, adoption of a ‘neutral’ stance cannot be achieved in 
practice.  This means that those who espouse rational planning are unaware that any 
data they gather about a dynamic and constantly-recreating problem space is 
inherently misleading, since they are failing to recognise their own, situated 
assumptions [5]. Ability to act as a professional is, we argue, crucially dependent 
upon ability to exercise extra-role behaviour. 
Our conclusion is that it is of utmost importance that efforts made within IS 
communities must prioritize human activity systems, and engage contextual 
dependencies from a critical perspective, in order to promote systems that are 
experienced as contextually relevant (useful). What Meyers and Klein [31] describe as 
an explicit critique and improvement of social condition is necessary to develop richer 
meanings and understandings.  
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